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When in-store display influences consumer choices, shelf space allocation can be 
strategically used by retailers to extract payments from manufacturers.    The paper finds that 
manufacturers with more popular brands have higher willingness-to-pay for the premium 
shelf spaces of supermarkets.  Shelf space fees soften inter-brand competition and result in 
higher sale-weighted average retail price as well as inter-brand price differences.  The fees 
increase the industry profit but lower the upstream profit.  Both the aggregate consumer 
surplus and social welfare are negatively affected.  This paper suggests that even when the 
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1. Introduction 
Shelf space fees are the payments by manufacturers to obtain access to retailers’ shelf 
spaces.  In the modern retail industry, the fees have become one of the major sources of 
revenue for retailers (Desiraju 2001).  Assuming that in-store display can influence 
consumers’ choices among competing brands, this paper studies how shelf space fees affect 
inter-brand competition and welfare.  Considers a spatial model where two competing 
manufacturers sell through two competing  supermarkets.  The  stores have two types of shelf 
spaces, which are called premium spaces and regular spaces.    The premium shelf spaces are 
more sale-facilitating.  The stores first auction off the right of using their premium shelf 
spaces to manufacturers.  The manufacturers, who produce substitute products, then choose 
their wholesale prices.  The stores engage in price competition with spatial differentiation.  
The consumers, who have unit demands and different tastes, first choose a store to visit and 
then choose a brand to purchase. 
It is shown that manufacturer with more popular brand has higher willing-to-pay for the 
premium shelf spaces.  And once a manufacturer wins the first auction of shelf space, its 
willingness-to-pay becomes higher in the second auction.  Hence we always have one 
manufacturer winning the premium shelf spaces of both stores in equilibrium.  Both 
manufacturers are worse off when the shelf space auctions are introduced, but the 
supermarkets are better off with them.  After the shelf space reallocation, the inter-brand 
competition is softened and the sale-weighted average retail price is higher.  On the other 
hand, the inter-brand price difference is larger and thus more consumers are induced to buy 
their less preferred brands.  Eventually both the aggregate consumer surplus and social  
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welfare are decreased.  This paper therefore suggests that the practices of demanding shelf 
space fees may be anticompetitive.   
Shelf space fee is an important category of slotting allowances.
1  The welfare 
implication of those allowances is controversial.  One line of studies suggests that the fees 
are the result of scarce shelf spaces facing escalating number of new products.  Since the 
products with highest potential are most likely to pay high shelf space fees and manufacturers 
typically know their products better than retailers, the fees help to efficiently allocation the 
limited shelf spaces, or help the retailers to screen quality new products (Kelly, 1991; Chu, 
1992; Sullivan, 1997; Lariviere and Padmanabhan, 1997; and others).    These models, which 
are based on asymmetric information regarding newly introduced products, are definitely 
sensible.  Nevertheless, the fees for new products only amount to a fraction of the slotting 
allowances observed in the real world.  Those theories might not explain why producers of 
established products also have to pay for retail shelf spaces. 
Another line of studies focuses on the exclusionary effect of slotting  fees.  The  findings 
are based on the buyer power of large retailers.  Shaffer (2001) finds that slotting fees can 
serve as a facilitating device, which depresses retail competition and lead to higher retail 
prices.  The mechanism has some similarity to the “strategic vertical separation” (Bonanno 
and Vickers, 1988; Rey and Stiglitz, 1988; and others).  Marx and Shaffer (2007) suggests 
that powerful manufacturers may intentionally bid up the shelf space fees in order to drive 
less powerful competitors out of the marketplace.  The total exclusion effect is apparently 
                                                        
1 There is no consensus on the definition of slotting allowances, which are also called slotting fees, listing fees, pay-to-stay fees, street 
money, etc.  Narrowly defined slotting fees refer to the “one-time payments a supplier makes to a retailer as a condition for the initial 
placement of the supplier’s product on the retailer’s store shelves or for initial access to the retailer’s warehouse space (FTC, 2003).”    More 
broadly defined slotting fees apply to not only new products but also matured products (Shaffer, 2001 and others).    
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anticompetitive.  Marx and Shaffer (2004) use a duopoly-monopoly model to show that a 
monopoly retailer may strategically limit the supply of shelf space in order to extract more 
shelf fees from manufacturers.  The findings in this line of studies are consistent with the 
commonly observed fact that slotting fees hinder small manufacturers from obtain adequate 
shelf spaces.  They also answer the question why retailers may use their buyer power to 
negotiate upfront payments rather than lower wholesale prices.  The current paper also 
considers the lump sum fees charged on established products.  But instead of considering 
the total exclusion effects, it studies how shelf space fees influence inter-brand competition.  
Moreover, the findings do not critically depend on retailer buyer power.   
The current paper also relates to the literature about in-store stimuli and consumer’s 
in-store decision-making.    There are considerable evidences suggesting that in-store stimuli, 
such as sale promotion and point-of-purchase display, significantly influence consumers’ 
brand choices.  For instances, Cavallo and Temares (1969) find that there are about 19 
percent of shoppers switching brands in the store with respect to three product categories 
(beverages, frozen & canned vegetables, and soaps & detergents).  Dreze, Hoch and Purk, 
(1994)’s field experiment on shelf management finds that shelf location has a large impact on 
sales.  Those studies imply that supermarkets have considerable capability in influencing 
consumers’ choices.  They can do that by changing consumers’ in-store search costs for 
different brands, or even altering consumers’ preferences among the brands.  Therefore, 
shelf management and other merchandising services might be strategically used by 
supermarkets to extract more revenue from suppliers.   
This paper supports the empirical findings of Rennhoff (2008).  Rennhoff considers a  
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model where competing manufacturers bid for premium shelf space at retail outlets through 
“merchandising  allowances”.  A  monopoly  retailer chooses display configurations and retail 
prices.  He estimates the parameters of the model with data of sales of four top selling 
brands of ketchup (Heinz, Hunts, Del Monte, and retailers’ private label) from the Food 
Marketing Policy Center’s IRI Infoscan Data Base (USA), and then uses the estimated 
parameters to conduct a counterfactural experiment to observe what if the firms are not 
allowed to offer merchandising allowances to obtain premium shelf spaces.    It is found that 
merchandising allowances increase retail price and profits, which means the retailer is better 
off while the consumers are worse off.    The allowances also lower the social welfare, which 
means they might be anticompetitive.   
  The rest of the paper will proceed as follows.  Section 2 describes a bilateral oligopoly 
with price competition.  Section 3 presents the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the 
game.  Section 4 discusses the welfare implication of supermarkets’ shelf space fees.  
Section 5 concludes the paper.    The proofs of the major results are put in the Appendix.   
 
2. A Model 
Consider a retail market in a linear city with length of L.  There are two symmetric 
supermarkets, denoted as a and b respectively, locating at the two ends of the city.  They 
have zero marginal operating costs.  There is a continuum of consumers evenly distributed 
along the linear city.    A consumer’s unitary transportation cost in the city is denoted as s>0.  
Since it is sL that is essential in measuring the degree of spatial differentiation between the 
two stores, we can assume L=1 without loss of generality.    
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The product market in consideration has two competing brands, manufactured by firm 1 
and 2 respectively.    We also denote the two brands as 1 and 2 respectively for convenience.   
The marginal production costs of the manufacturers are assumed to be zero.
2  Consumers 
have unit demand toward the products with high enough reservation  prices.  Assume  that  the 
measure of the consumers is  ef + , where  0 ef ≥> .  If the two brands of products were 
equally priced and symmetrically (or “naturally”) displayed in the stores, there are e 







 of the market respectively in that case.  We say 
manufacturer 1 has a better brand name than 2 when  ef > .  However, for a given  R Δ∈ , 
if brand 1 were sold at a price that is  Δ higher  (or −Δ  lower) than brand 2, there would be 
tΔ consumers  switching  from  brand 1 to brand 2 (or  t − Δ  consumers switching from brand 
2 to brand 1), where  0 t > .
3    Note that the product differentiation between the two brands is 
depicted by parameter t.  A larger t indicates smaller product differentiation.
4  Assume 
that the tastes of the consumers cannot be directly observed by the retailers, which means 
direct price discrimination is impossible.  We also assume that the consumers’ preferences 
between the two brands are unrelated to their geographical locations.   
Given the consumer tastes prescribed above, the social welfare is maximized when the 
                                                        
2 It appears that the model implicitly assumes that the upstream and downstream firms have the same marginal costs.  But it is easy to 
show that this simplification does not affect the major results.   
3 One might suggest that the number of switchers should positively depend on the original customer base of the high price store.  In that 
case, the manufacturer with a better brand name would have even stronger incentive to bid for the premium shelf spaces of the supermarkets.  
Therefore the major results of the paper would not be notably affected.   
4 The product market is not represented by a Hotelling model because the analysis is painful when the consumer tastes are not uniformly 
distributed along the “linear city”.  Nevertheless, the main results are unlikely to be affected as long as the consumer tastes are 
continuously distributed between the two brands.   The key point is that if the distribution is biased toward brand 1, then the profit margin 
of manufacturer 1 is larger.    
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two brands are symmetrically displayed and equally priced.  As assumed, the symmetry 
in-store display minimizes the consumers’ total search cost.  On the other hand, inter-brand 
price difference induces some consumers to purchase their less preferred brand, which leads 
to welfare losses.    Since the number of switchers is linear to the price difference, the welfare 
loss from price difference  Δ is  







= Δ ∫ .   
Assume that consumers observe the sale-weighted average retail prices of the stores but 
not the exact retail prices of the individual products.    Therefore a supermarket does not mind 
putting the same profit margins on the two brands in equilibrium.  In order to simplify the 
modeling, we indeed assume that the profit margins of the two brands are the same within 
each store.  We will see that this assumption leads to two consequences.  First, the profit 
margins of the stores only depend on the inter-store spatial differentiation.  Second, the 
wholesale prices of the manufacturers only depend on the inter-brand product differentiation.   
Denote the profit margins of the two supermarkets as  α  and β  respectively.  
Each supermarket has two types of shelf spaces, premium shelf spaces and regular shelf 
spaces.    The supermarkets can decide which brand of product to be displayed on which type 
of shelf spaces.    Conditional on both brands are equally priced, if a brand were displayed on 
the premium shelf space, then compared to the case where the two brands are symmetrically 




 of the consumers 
that visit the store, where 0 f δ <<.  For instance, if brand 1 were displayed on the 





 of the store’s shoppers would choose brand 1, conditional  
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on both brands are offered at the same price.    In-store display may affect consumers’ choices 
by altering their preferences between the two brands or their in-store search costs for the 
products.  This paper does not explicitly model each consumer’s in-store search cost, but 
assumes that the total search cost of the consumers is minimized when the two brands are 
symmetrically (or naturally) displayed.  In other words, the total in-store search cost 
increases when a retailer strategically manipulates the in-store display.     
 
Lemma 1:  If a supermarket has equal and fixed profit margins on the two brands, then its 
premium shelf space is more valuable to the manufacturer that has a better brand name.   
 
  Intuitively, a manufacturer that has a better brand name enjoy a larger margin between its 
wholesale price and marginal cost.
5  The premium shelf spaces, which direct more 
customers to the brands that take the spaces, generate more profit for the manufacturer that 
has a larger profit margin.  Therefore a manufacturer with a better brand name is willing to 
pay more for the spaces.  Lemma 1 is helpful in understanding the mechanism behind the 
main results of this paper.   
The game played in this markets is as following: First, supermarket a sells the right of 
using its premium shelf space to a manufacturer through a standard English auction (with 
private values);  Second, observing the result of the first stage, supermarket b auctions off 
its premium shelf space through a English auction;    Third, the manufacturers simultaneously 
                                                        
5  This outcome would be more significant if the manufacturer with a better brand name has lower marginal production cost.    Therefore the 
results of this paper would remain valid.    On the other hand, the manufacturer with a better brand name may not have larger profit margin 
if its marginal cost is much higher than its rivals.    In that case, the results of the current paper do not apply.    
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announce their wholesale prices  1 w  and  2 w ;  Fourth, the supermarkets purchase the 
products from the manufacturers and determine their retail profit margins;
6  Finally, the 
consumers enter the market and decide which store to go and which brand to purchase. 
  The stores auction off their premium shelf spaces sequentially in the game.  This 
assumption is invoked because a manufacturer’s willingness-to-pay for the premium shelf 
space of a store depends on whether it has already won the counterpart in the other store.  
The game would be more complicated if the two auctions must be conducted simultaneously, 
since each bidder would have to form a “rational” belief about the outcome of the other 
auction.    But the results of this paper do not appear to be sensitive to this treatment.    On the 
other hand, sequential auctioning might also be more realistic than simultaneous auctioning. 
The retail prices are the sums of the wholesale prices and the retail profit margins.    The 
modeling implies that the inter-brand price differences are the same in both stores, and the 
inter-store price differences are the same for both brands.    The retail prices of the two brands 
and the price differences in the market are illustrated in following table.   
Table 1: The retail price configuration in the market 
          
Manufacturer 1: 
Wholesale price  1 w 
Manufacturer 2: 
Wholesale price  2 w
Inter-brand 
difference 
Store a: margin  α   11 a rw α =+   22 a rw α = +   12 ww −  
Store b: margin  β   11 b rw β =+   22 b rw β = +   12 ww −  
Inter-store difference α β −   α β −    
                                                        
6  Assume that the retail inventories can be instantly refilled.    Hence the supermarkets engage in an unconstrained price competition.    
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3.  The Equilibrium 
We consider the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.  At the final  stage, the 
number of consumers that visit each store only depends on the difference between the stores’ 
profit margins, which is  α β − .    Based on this observation, we can solve the fourth stage of 
the game and obtain following result.   
 
Lemma 2:  In the retail market, the supermarkets’ equilibrium profit margins are 
(2)          
** s αβ = =  
 
Hence the markups of the supermarkets only depend on the degree of spatial 
differentiation between the stores.  In particular, they do not depend on the shelf space 
allocation.  An immediate implication of Lemma 2 is that each supermarket’s ex post profit 




, which does not depend on the inter-brand competition or the 
shelf space allocation.   
At the third stage of the game, the manufacturers determine their wholesale prices.    The 
subgame equilibrium wholesale prices depend on the outcomes of the two auctions in the first 
two stages, which have three possible cases.   
Case 1: Manufacturer 1, which has a better brand name, obtains both stores’ premium 
shelf spaces.    Denote the consequent wholesale prices as 
00
12 ,) ww
++ （ . 
Case 2: Manufacturer 2, which has a less popular brand name, obtains both stores’ 
premium shelf spaces.    Denote the consequent wholesale prices as 
00
12 ,) ww
++ （ .  
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Case 3: Each manufacturer obtains the premium shelf space of one store.  Denote the 
consequent wholesale prices as 
00
12 ,) ww
+ + （ . 
Consider case 1 first.  Recall that the inter-brand price differences are  12 ww −  in both 
supermarkets, which induces  12 () tw w −  consumers to switch from brand 1 to 2 (or induces 
21 () tw w −  consumers to switch from brand 2 to 1).  Hence the profit functions of the 
manufacturers are   
(3)            11 12 [( ) ] we tw w π δ =+ −− and 
( 4 )            22 1 2 [( ) ] wf t w w π δ =− + −  
respectively.  The  first  order  conditions of the profit maximization problems are 


















=+ .      
Therefore the equilibrium wholesale prices are   
















= .  
The manufacturers’ equilibrium quantities of sales are 














= .  





, is unaffected by the allocation 
of shelf spaces in this case.  The sale-weighted average wholesale price must get higher 
since manufacturer 1 sells more than manufacturer 2.  The manufacturers’ profits at the 
second stage of the game are:   





















= .  
In case 2, where manufacturer 2’ product is displayed on the premium shelf spaces of 
both stores, parallel analyses leads to following subgame equilibrium outcome.    
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= .  
In case 3, suppose that manufacturer 1 wins the premium shelf space of supermarket a, 
while manufacturer 2 wins that of supermarket b.    By the symmetry of the supermarkets, we 
have each store attracting half of the consumers.    The profit of each manufacturer is the sum 











− − ++ −+
=⋅ − +⋅ −
++
 
( 1 2 )                11 2 [( ) ] we tw w =−−.  
Similarly, manufacturer 2’s profit function is   
( 1 3 )                     22 1 2 [( ) ] wf t w w π = +−.        
Notice that the manufacturers’ profits shown in (12) and (13) do not depend on parameter  δ .  
Hence a manufacturer’s advantageous position in one store is exactly canceled out by its 
disadvantageous position in the other store.     
The first order conditions of the manufacturers’ profit maximization problems are 














=+ ,                    
We have following subgame equilibrium outcome. 
























































= .      
Although shelf space fees transfer profits from manufacturers to supermarkets, the  
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subgame equilibrium in case 3 is almost identical to the case when the two brands are 
symmetrically displayed in all stores.  The ex post profits of the manufacturers in the three 
cases are summarized in Table 2.     








 At  the  second stage of the game, where the manufacturers bid for the premium shelf 
space of store b, the auction is conducted under two possible outcomes of stage 1, where 
manufacture 1 or 2 wins the first auction.     
 
Lemma 3: A manufacturer’s willingness-to-pay for the premium shelf space of store b is 
higher if it has already won the auction of store a.   
 
 At  the  first stage of the game, the manufacturers anticipate the subsequent plays of the 
game and bid for the premium shelf space of store a.  It turns out that the larger 
manufacturer would win both auctions.     
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Lemma 4: If e f > , then manufacturer 1 wins the premium shelf spaces of both stores in the 
subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.     
  
From Lemma 4 and analyses of Case 1 of the third stage, we can characterize the 
equilibrium of the market as follows.    The proof is straightforward.    I omit the details.   
 
Proposition 1: If e f > , manufacturer 1 wins both stores’ premium shelf spaces and the 
equilibrium prices and sales of the upstream market are 





































We see from Proposition 1 that the asymmetric shelf space display raises the price and 
quantity of sale of the product with better brand name, while lowers those with less popular 
brand name.  In other words, the shelf space fees help the larger manufacturer to become 
even larger. 
If the manufacturers are symmetric, i.e.,  ef = , and tie is impossible in the auctions, 
then there are two possible equilibria where one of the manufacturers wins both stores’ 
premium shelf spaces.  Indeed, whoever wins the first auction would win the second 










, while the 










.  Therefore an asymmetric 
equilibrium would arise from a symmetric setup.  
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4.  Welfare  
If the supermarkets are prohibited from charging shelf space fees, they would display all 
brands symmetrically in order to minimize consumer search cost.
7  When the fees are 
allowed, one can easily calculate the sale-weighted average wholesale price from Proposition 
1, which is   




55 82 2 ( )
9( )
qqefe f e f
www
ef ef t ef




It increases with δ .  From this perspective, the ex post inter-brand competition may be 
weakened by the shelf space auctions.  Intuitively, when manufacturer 1 obtains the 
premium shelf spaces of the supermarkets, it is able to sell more at higher price, which leads 
to higher average prices.  Since the retail profit margins are constant no matter the fees are 
allowed or not, the weighted average retail price is also higher with the fees.  I write this 
result as a corollary of Proposition 1.   
 
Corollary 1: The sale-weighted average wholesale price and retail price are higher with the 
shelf space fees.    Consequently, the total revenue of the industry and the total payment of the 
consumers are higher with the fees.   
 
The shelf space reallocation leads to asymmetric in-store display of the two brands.  It 
enlarges the degree of asymmetry between the brands.    The price difference between the two 
                                                        
7 In contrast, Rennhoff (2004) assumes that when merchandising allowances are banned, the monopoly retailer still faces an optimality 
problem in choosing a brand of product for its premium shelf space.    This treatment is appropriate since the retailer can set different profit 
margins for different brands.    But in the current paper the stores have no incentive to promote a brand unless they can collect fees for it.    
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brands would then be enlarged.    Shelf space auctions tend to reinforce the market position of 
the manufacturers that have more popular brands.    This effect might be undesirable from the 
perspective of competition authorities.  Nevertheless, even the large manufacturer cannot 
gain from the shelf space fees in this static model.   
 
Corollary 2: The manufacturers are worse off while the supermarkets are better off with the 
shelf space fees.     
 
Now we consider the consumer surplus and social welfare.  Denote  i V  as consumer 
i’s reservation value toward his/her preferred brand.  Then  i
i
VV =∑  is the consumers’ 
aggregate reservation value when resources are social-optimally allocated.  Denote P as the 
consumers’ total payment, B as the consumers’ total loss from using their less preferred 
products, and S as the consumers’ total in-store search cost.  Then the aggregate consumer 
surplus is   
(21)                Consumer  surplus VPBS = −−−. 
And the social welfare is   
( 2 2 )           S o c i a l   w e l f a r e VBS = −−. 
Note that though in-store display may affect the consumers’ preferences between the two 
brands, but it may not affect the aggregate reservation value V.  The total payment P is 
raised by the shelf space fees (Corollary 1).  The loss B is increased when shelf space fees 
push up inter-brand price differences and thus more consumers end up with their less  
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preferred brands.  Indeed, a key point of this paper is that shelf space fees make the 
upstream market less balanced and thus lead to welfare loss.    Finally, we have assumed that 
manipulating in-store display never reduces the consumers’ total search cost.  Therefore 
from (21) and (22) we immediately have following result. 
 
Preposition 2: If in-store display cannot affect consumers’ aggregate reservation value V , 
then the shelf space fees reduce the aggregate consumer surplus and the social welfare.  
 
Note that the results of this paper actually rely on the fact that the manufacturer with a 
better brand name attains a larger profit margin (in the absence of shelf space fees), and thus 
has larger incentive to bid for the premium shelf spaces.  The distortion in the market is 
enlarged when the leading manufacturer’s market position is reinforced by the favorable shelf 
space allocation.  The idea might be extended to a model where consumers have more 
general demand functions, as long as the manufacturer with a better brand name tends to have 
a larger profit margin.    Details are left for future studies.    Is it possible for the manufacturer 
with a better brand name to have smaller profit margin than its rivals?  The answer is yes.  
But that usually happens when the better-known manufacturer has substantially higher 
marginal production cost than its rivals.  Theoretically, an exceedingly efficient entrant 
manufacturer, who does not have a well-known brand name, may bid aggressively for the 
premium shelf spaces of retail stores.  In that case, the welfare implications of shelf space 
fees could be more positive compared to those found in the current paper.   
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5.  Concluding remarks 
Previous literature on the anticompetitive effects of shelf space fees emphasizes the total 
exclusion outcome where some manufacturers are driven out of retail stores.  This paper 
instead models how the fees influence inter-brand competition.  The model suggests that 
manufacturers with better brand names usually have higher willingness-to-pay for the shelf 
spaces of retail stores.  Therefore shelf space fees tend to strengthen the market position of 
those large manufacturers.  The finding is consistent with the empirical observation that 
small manufacturers are often unable to obtain adequate shelf spaces when retailers demand 
shelf space fees or slotting allowances.  The model also finds that when the degree of 
asymmetry in the upstream market increases, the inter-brand competition would be softened 
and the average selling price would be higher.  Hence shelf space fees eventually decrease 
aggregate consumer surplus.  The fees decrease the social welfare since they enlarge 
inter-brand price differences, which induce more consumers to choose their less preferred 
brands.    The findings support the view that shelf space fees, or slotting allowances, might be 
anticompetitive.  
The model of this paper does not critically rely on retailer market power.  Even when 
the retailers are monopolistic competitive, they might still demand shelf space fees as long as 
in-store display influences consumer choices.  On the other hand, since shelf space fees 
increase the profitability of supermarkets for given market structure, there might be excess 
entry to the retail market when the fees are allowed.  That situation may result in more 
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Proof of Lemma 1: Denote the manufacturers’ wholesale prices as  1 w  and  2 w .  If 
manufacturer 1 obtains the premium shelf space, the two manufacturers’ profit functions are 
( A 1 )           11 1 2 [( ) ] kw e t w w π δ =+ − −    and   22 1 2 [( ) ] kw f t w w π δ = −+ −  
respectively, where k represents the market share of the supermarket.  Solving the game 
between the manufacturers in this store, we have equilibrium wholesale prices and profits of 
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Similarly, if manufacturer 2 obtains the premium shelf space, the two manufacturers’ profit 
functions are 
( A 4 )        11 1 2 [( ) ] kw e t w w π δ =− − −  and   22 1 2 [( ) ] kw f t w w π δ = ++ −  
respectively.    Solving the game, we have equilibrium wholesale prices and profits of 
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Hence manufacturer 1 is willing to pay up to 
**
11 ' π π −  while manufacturer 2 is willing to 
pay up to 
**
22 ' π π −   for the premium shelf space.    It is easy to check that   
( A 7 )            
** **
11 22 '' π ππ π −>− ,  when ef > . 
Hence the premium shelf space is more valuable to manufacturer 1 that has a better brand 
name.  Q.E.D.  
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Proof of Lemma 2: Denote the location of the consumer that is indifferent to purchasing 
from either store as  [0,1] x∈ .  Conditional  on  s αβ − < , it satisfies   







Since the implied density of consumers in the city is e+f, the profit functions of the two 
supermarkets are   






















    
respectively.  The  first order conditions are
 








s β α = +   
respectively.  From (A11) we immediately have the stores’ equilibrium profit margins 
prescribed in (2).    Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 3: If manufacturer 1 does not win the first auction, it is willing to pay up to   








δ δ + −
 
for the premium shelf space of store b.  However, if manufacturer 1 has already won the 
auction of store a, it is willing to pay up to   










for the premium shelf space of store b.  It is easy to check that 
00 0 0
1111 π πππ
+ ++ + −<− as 
long as  0 δ > .  Hence manufacturer 1’s willingness-to-pay is higher in later case.  
Similarly, we can show that manufacturer 2 is willing to pay strictly more in the second 
auction if it has already won the first one.     Q.E.D.  
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Proof of Lemma 4: In the second stage of the game, if manufacturer 1 has won the first 
auction, it would surely win the second auction according to Lemma 1.  In the English 
auction with private values, store b’s revenue from the auction should be the loser’s valuation 
of the premium shelf space at that stage, which is   












If manufacturer 2 has won the first auction, it would win the second auction if and only if 
( A   1 5 )         
00 0 0
2211 π πππ
++ + + −≥− , 
which happens when  ef δ ≥− , and the winning price would be   











−= .  
If  ef δ <− , manufacturer 1 would win the second auction at price 










++ + + +
−= .      
    First consider the case  ef δ ≥− .  At the first stage of the game, manufacturer 1 
understands that if it wins the first auction, it would win the second one too.    On the contrary, 
if it loses the first auction, it would lose the second one as well.  Manufacturer 1’s 
willingness-to-pay in the first auction is   
( A 1 8 )          
00 0 0 0
12 21 [( ) ] π ππ π
++ + −− − . 
Similarly, manufacturer 2 understands that it would win the second auction if and only if it 
could win the first one.    Hence to win the first auction it is willing to pay up to   
( A 1 9 )          
00 0 0 0
21 1 2 [( ) ] π ππ π
++ + −− − . 
One can check that (A19) is less than (A18).    Hence manufacturer 1 wins the first auction at  
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, and then also wins the second auction. 
  Now consider the case  ef δ <− .  Then no matter who wins the first auction, 
manufacturer 1 would win the second auction.  Manufacturer 1’s willingness-to-pay in the 
first auction is   
 
00 0 0 0
12 2 12 2 [ ( )] [ ( )] ππ π ππ π
++ + + ++ + −− −−−  
 
222 2( 2 ) 2( 2) 2( 2)
999
e f ef ef
ttt
δ δδ δδ δ + + +− ++
=−+ 
(A20)         






In contrast, manufacturer 2’s willingness-to-pay in the first auction is   










+ +− + +
−= < .     





δ δ + −
, and then also wins 
the second auction. 
Summing up, manufacturer 1 must win both auctions.   Q.E.D.  
 
Proof of Corollary 2: Suppose manufacturer 1 always wins the auctions of shelf spaces.  
The manufacturers’ ex post gross profits at the third stage of the game are   























respectively.  One can see that the aggregate ex post profit is higher with the fees, but 
manufacturer 2’s ex post profit is lower with the fees.  On the other hand, manufacturer 1 
pays shelf space fees of  
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≥− ⎪ ⎪ = ⎨
+− ⎪ < − ⎪ ⎩
 
in the first auction and   













in the second auction.    So the total payment is   
















+ ⎧ ≥− ⎪ ⎪ += ⎨
+− ⎪ < −
⎪ ⎩
.  
But manufacturer 1’s profit gain from the premium shelf spaces is   













which is always smaller than  12 () () pp δ δ +  for any 0 f δ < < .  Hence manufacturer 1 is 
also worse off with the shelf space fees.   
  Since the industry revenue is higher (Corollary 1) while the upstream profit is lower with 
the shelf space fees, the supermarkets must gain from the fees.  Indeed, since the ex post 
profits are constant (lemma 2), the shelf space fees are the stores’ net gain.   Q.E.D.  